This study explores the long-run e¤ects of in ‡ation in a two-country Schumpeterian growth model with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and R&D investment. We …nd that increasing domestic in ‡ation reduces domestic R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth in a country depends on both domestic and foreign technologies, increasing foreign in ‡ation also a¤ects the domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally to maximize the welfare of domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium in ‡ation rates are generally higher than the optimal in ‡ation rates chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the welfare of both domestic and foreign households. Under the CIA constraint on R&D (consumption), a larger market power of …rms ampli…es (mitigates) this in ‡ationary bias. We use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of in ‡a-tion on R&D and also calibrate the two-country model to data in the Euro Area and the US to quantify the welfare e¤ects of decreasing the in ‡ation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level.
Introduction
This study explores the long-run e¤ects of in ‡ation on economic growth and social welfare in an open economy. We develop a two-country version of the Schumpeterian growth model and introduce money demand into the model via a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D investment in each country. Empirical evidence supports the view that R&D investment is severely a¤ected by cash requirements. 1 We capture these cash requirements on R&D using a CIA constraint. Given this CIA constraint on R&D, in ‡ation that determines the opportunity cost of cash holdings a¤ects R&D investment, economic growth and social welfare. 2 In an open economy, in ‡ation by a¤ecting innovation and technologies also has spillover e¤ects across countries through international trade. 3 Our model captures these spillover e¤ects in the form of international technology spillovers and international business stealing, which are novel channels through which cross-border monetary spillovers shape the outcome of monetary policy competition across countries.
The results from our growth-theoretic analysis can be summarized as follows. An increase in domestic in ‡ation decreases domestic R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth in a country depends on both domestic and foreign technologies, an increase in foreign in ‡ation also a¤ects the domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally to maximize the welfare of only domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium in ‡ation rates are generally di¤erent from the optimal in ‡ation rates chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of domestic and foreign households. We …nd that under the special case of inelastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium in ‡ation rates coincide with the optimal in ‡ation rates. However, under the more general case of elastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium in ‡ation rates become higher than the optimal in ‡ation rates due to a cross-country spillover e¤ect of monetary policy. The intuition can be explained as follows. When the government in a country reduces its in ‡ation, the welfare gain from increased R&D is shared by the other country through technology spillovers, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor supply falls entirely on domestic households. As a result, the governments do not reduce in ‡ation su¢ ciently in the Nash equilibrium.
The wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal in ‡ation rates depends on the market power of …rms. Under the CIA constraint on consumption, a larger markup reduces this wedge. This …nding is consistent with the interesting insight of Arseneau (2007) , who shows that the market power of …rms has a dampening e¤ect on the in ‡ationary bias from monetary policy competition analyzed in an in ‡uential study by Cooley and Quadrini (2003) . However, under the CIA constraint on R&D investment, we have the opposite result that a larger markup ampli…es the in ‡ationary bias from monetary policy competition. These di¤erent implications highlight the importance of the di¤erences between the two CIA constraints. The main di¤erence between the CIA constraint on consumption and the CIA constraint on R&D is that under the latter, an increase in the in ‡ation rate leads to a reallocation of labor from R&D to production. As a result, higher in ‡ation rates would be chosen by governments in the Nash equilibrium to depress R&D when the negative R&D externality in the form of a business-stealing e¤ect determined by the markup becomes stronger. In contrast, under the CIA constraint on consumption, this reallocation e¤ect is absent because an increase in the in ‡ation rate reduces both R&D and production by decreasing labor supply. Given that increasing the markup worsens a monopolistic distortionary e¤ect on the production of goods, governments would reduce in ‡ation in the Nash equilibrium to stimulate production when this monopolistic distortion measured by the markup becomes stronger.
We use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of in ‡ation on R&D and …nd that there is a statistically signi…cant negative relationship between the in ‡ation rate and the R&D share of GDP. Our preferred regression estimate shows that the semi-elasticity of R&D with respect to in ‡ation is -0.374 (i.e., a 1% increase in the in ‡ation rate is associated with a decrease in the R&D share of GDP by 0.374 percent). We also calibrate the twocountry model to aggregate data in the Euro Area and the US to simulate the quantitative e¤ects of in ‡ation on R&D. We …nd that the simulated semi-elasticities of R&D with respect to in ‡ation are -0.448 in the Euro Area and -0.266 in the US. These values are in line with the regression estimate.
In the numerical analysis of the Nash equilibrium, we consider the case in which …nal goods are produced by a CES aggregate of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, which introduces an international business-stealing e¤ect across countries. In other words, when a country decreases its in ‡ation to improve domestic technology, domestic …rms are able to capture a larger share of the global market due to the substitutability of domestic and foreign intermediate goods. This e¤ect represents a negative externality of monetary policy. Together with the positive externality from technology spillovers, we …nd that the Nash equilibrium continues to feature an in ‡ationary bias. Therefore, we proceed to quantify the welfare e¤ects of decreasing the in ‡ation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level. We …nd that the Friedman rule is optimal (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate maximizes welfare). In this case, decreasing the in ‡ation rates from the Nash equilibrium to achieve a zero nominal interest rate in both economies would lead to nonnegligible welfare gains that are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 1.038% in the US and 0.249% in the Euro Area. However, a unilateral deviation to decrease the in ‡ation rate from the Nash equilibrium would hurt the domestic economy and only bene…t the foreign economy. For example, we …nd that a unilateral decrease in the in ‡ation rate in the Euro Area would reduce its welfare by 0.213% but increase welfare in the US by 1.079%.
Literature review
Given that one of the key assumptions of our model is the presence of a CIA constraint on R&D, here we …rst review the evidence in favor of this assumption. Hall (1992) Brown and Petersen (2014) show that …rms use cash reserves to …nance R&D but not capital investment. Berentsen et al. (2012) argue that information frictions and limited collateral value of intangible R&D capital prevent …rms from …nancing R&D investment through debt or equity forcing them to fund R&D projects with cash reserves. A recent study by Falato and Sim (2014) provides causal evidence that R&D is a …rst-order determinant of …rms'cash holdings. They use …rm-level data in the US to show that …rms'cash holdings increase (decrease) signi…cantly in response to a rise (cut) in R&D tax credits, 4 which vary across states and time. Furthermore, these e¤ects are stronger for …rms that have less access to debt/equity …nancing. These results suggest that due to the presence of …nancing frictions, …rms hold cash to …nance their R&D investment. As for the e¤ect of in ‡ation on …rms'cash holdings, Pinkowitz et al. This study also relates to the growth-theoretic literature of in ‡ation and economic growth, which explores the long-run e¤ects of in ‡ation on capital investment. Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985) provide the seminal studies of the CIA constraint on capital investment in the Neoclassical growth model. Subsequent studies, such as Stadler (1990) , Gomme (1993) , Dotsey and Ireland (1996) , Wu and Zhang (1998) and Ho et al. (2007) , explore the e¤ects of monetary policy in endogenous growth models. Instead of analyzing monetary policy in capital-based growth models, we consider an R&D-based growth model in which economic growth is driven by R&D investment. The seminal study in this literature of in ‡ation and innovation-driven growth is Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) , who explore the e¤ects of a CIA constraint on consumption in a Romer variety-expanding model. 5 In contrast, we consider a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model and analyze the e¤ects of in ‡ation via a CIA constraint on R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) . 6 Chu and Ji (2014) and Huang et al. (2013) also analyze monetary policy via CIA constraints but in a Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure. The present study di¤ers from the closed-economy analyses in Chu and Cozzi (2014), Chu and Ji (2014) and Huang et al. (2013) by considering a two-country setting with international trade in intermediate goods. Given that technologies transfer across countries through trade, monetary policy by a¤ecting domestic innovation has a technology spillover e¤ect across countries. Our open-economy model allows us to model and explore this technology spillover e¤ect and also an international business-stealing e¤ect under which the unilateral choice of monetary policy in the Nash equilibrium may deviate from globally optimal monetary policy. As Corsetti et al. (2010) wrote, "ine¢ ciencies and trade-o¤s with speci…c international dimensions result from cross-border monetary spillovers when these are not internalized by national monetary authorities". Indeed, we …nd that the Nash equilibrium features a signi…cant in ‡ationary bias. Given studies in the literature, such as Dotsey and Ireland (1996) Bergin and Corsetti (2013) . These studies analyze interesting channels, such as output gap stabilization, terms of trade improvement and production reallocation externality, and their implications on welfare gains from monetary policy coordination. The present study complements these in ‡uential studies by exploring the internalization of technology spillovers as a novel channel of welfare gains from monetary policy coordination given that R&D investment is an important component of corporate investment that central banks pay attention to when conducting monetary policy.
Finally, this study also contributes to a small but growing literature that explores international policy cooperation in R&D-based growth models that involve technology spillovers and international business-stealing e¤ects across countries. For example, Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) analyze patent policy, whereas Impullitti (2007 Impullitti ( , 2010 and Kondo (2013) explore R&D subsidies. This paper complements these interesting studies by focusing on monetary policy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 documents stylized facts. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of in ‡ation. Section 5 provides a quantitative analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Stylized facts
In this section, we use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of in ‡ation on R&D. Our data set covers 34 OECD countries for the period 1960-2012 at yearly frequency. We collect data on R&D from Eurostat/UNESCO and data on in ‡ation, population, GDP, imports and exports from the World Development Indicators. We also use the GinartePark index of patent rights from Park (2008) and the Fraser index of economic freedom. 7 We measure the level of income by real PPP-adjusted GDP per capita and the degree of openness to trade by the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of these variables. Our theoretical model predicts a negative relationship between in ‡ation and R&D. Our regression results are consistent with this theoretical implication. Table 2 reports the results from our panel regressions and shows a negative relationship between in ‡ation and R&D. The regression coe¢ cients on in ‡ation are all signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1 percent level. In our preferred regression speci…cation with both country and year …xed e¤ects, the estimated semi-elasticity of R&D with respect to in ‡ation is -0.374. In other words, a 1% increase in the in ‡ation rate is associated with a decrease in the R&D share of GDP by 0.374 percent. To identify whether it is the long-run or short-run component of in ‡ation that is driving our results, we have also used the Hodrick-Prescott …lter to extract the trend and the cyclical component of in ‡ation. After repeating the regressions in Table  2 , we …nd that the negative relationship between R&D and in ‡ation is all due to trend in ‡ation; see Table 3 in which we report only the coe¢ cient of trend in ‡ation to conserve space. 8 Given that trend in ‡ation is more likely to a¤ect in ‡ation expectations 9 and be re ‡ected in the nominal interest rate that determines the opportunity cost associated with cash-in-advance constraints, we view these results as encouraging motivating evidence for our theory. 11 We remove scale e¤ects in the Schumpeterian model by allowing for increasing complexity in innovation as in Segerstrom (1998) . 12 Furthermore, we modify the Schumpeterian model by introducing money demand via CIA constraints on consumption and R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) and extending the closed-economy model into a two-country setting with trade in intermediate goods. The home country is denoted with a superscript h, whereas the foreign country is denoted with a superscript f . Both countries invest in R&D, but we allow for asymmetry across the two countries in a number of structural parameters. Following a common treatment in this type of two-country models, we assume labor immobility across countries. Given that the quality-ladder model has been well-studied, we will describe the familiar components brie ‡y but discuss new features in details. Furthermore, to conserve space, we will only present equations for the home country h, but readers are advised to keep in mind that for each equation we present, there is an analogous equation for the foreign country f . 8 Regression results for cyclical in ‡ation are available in an unpublished appendix. 9 We follow Orr et al. (1995), Ardagna et al. (2007) and Ardagna (2009) to use trend in ‡ation from the Hodrick-Prescott …lter as a proxy for in ‡ation expectations. 10 Using OECD patent databases, we have also brie ‡y explored the e¤ects of in ‡ation on the number of patent grants at USPTO by inventors'country of origin from 1976 to 2013 and found a signi…cant negative relationship between the two variables; regression results are available in an unpublished appendix. 11 See also Segerstrom et al. (1990) for another seminal study of the quality-ladder model. 12 See for example Jones (1999) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models.
Household
In each country, there is a representative household. In country h, the population size is N h t , and its law of motion is _ N h t = nN h t , where n > 0 is the exogenous population growth rate. Total population in the world is N t = N h t + N f t , where N f t is the population size in country f , which is assumed to have the same population growth rate n. The lifetime utility function of the household in country h is given by
where c h t denotes per capita consumption of …nal goods and l h t denotes the supply of labor per person in country h at time t. The parameters > 0 and h 0 determine respectively subjective discounting and leisure preference. We allow for asymmetry in h across the two countries.
The asset-accumulation equation expressed in real terms (i.e., denominated in units of …nal goods) is given by 
Finally, the intertemporal optimality condition is
In the case of a constant nominal interest rate i h , (3) and (5) n. We consider a global …nancial market. In this case, the real interest rates in the two countries must be equal such that r h t = r f t = r t . 15 Given that the distribution of …nancial assets across the two countries is indeterminate, we follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to assume that monopolistic …rms created by innovation of domestic entrepreneurs are owned by the domestic household. Furthermore, in our model, there is no incentive for the household to hold foreign currency even when the nominal interest rates di¤er across countries. The reason is that given the same real interest rate across countries as a result of the global …nancial market, di¤erences in the nominal interest rates are due to di¤erences in the in ‡ation rates, which in turn equal percent changes in the nominal exchange rate because the law of one price holds in our model as we discuss below. Given that the uncovered interest rate parity holds in our model, a small transaction cost on foreign exchange would discourage the household from holding foreign currency. 16 
Final goods
Final goods for consumption in the two countries are produced by competitive …rms that aggregate two types of intermediate goods using a standard CES aggregator given by
where Y Suppose the nominal price of …nal goods in country h is p h c;t , which is denominated in units of currency in country h. Then, because …nal goods can be freely traded across the two countries, 17 the law of one price holds such that the nominal price of …nal goods denominated in units of currency in country f is p f c;t = " t p h c;t , where " t is the nominal exchange rate.
Intermediate goods
Intermediate goods are also produced by competitive …rms. Competitive …rms in country h produce Y h t by aggregating a unit continuum of di¤erentiated domestic inputs X 
From pro…t maximization, the conditional demand functions for
where p 
Di¤erentiated inputs
In country h, there is a unit continuum of di¤erentiated inputs indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. In each industry j 2 [0; 1], there is an industry leader who dominates the market temporarily until the arrival of the next innovation. 20 The industry leader employs domestic workers to produce X h t (j). 21 Speci…cally, the production function is given by
17 Even if …nal goods cannot be traded, the fact that intermediate goods are freely traded is su¢ cient to ensure p f c;t = " t p h c;t . 18 Our results are robust to a more general CES aggregator, under which the monopolistic markup of di¤erentiated inputs may be determined by the elasticity of substituition. For simplicity, we focus on the Cobb-Douglas aggregator. 19 Derivations available in an unpublished appendix. 20 This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature; see Cozzi (2007) for a discussion. 21 In order to keep the analysis tractable, we do not consider production o¤shoring in this study; see Chu, Cozzi and Furukawa (2013) for a North-South analysis of monetary policy with production o¤shoring.
where L h x;t (j) denotes production labor in industry j of country h. z h > 1 is the step size of innovation in country h, and we allow this parameter to di¤er across countries. q h t (j) is the number of quality improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t.
22
Given (z h ) q h t (j) in industry j, the leader's marginal cost function for the production of
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to markup pricing. This markup ratio is assumed to equal the step size z h of innovation in Grossman and Helpman (1991). Here we allow for variable patent breadth similar to Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) by assuming that the markup h > 1 is a policy instrument determined by the patent authority. 23 For simplicity, we focus on the case in which h = f = , and this assumption can be partly justi…ed by the harmonization of patent protection across countries as a result of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) e¤ective since 1996. 24 Furthermore, given that patent policy is not designed by the monetary authority in reality, 25 we treat as exogenous when deriving optimal monetary policy. Given the markup ratio , the price of
22 It is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view of quality improvement as in Peretto (1998) . 23 To model patent breadth, we …rst make a standard assumption in the literature, see for example Howitt (1999) and Segerstrom (2000) , that once the incumbent leaves the market, she cannot threaten to reenter the market due to a reentry cost. As a result of the incumbent stopping production, the entrant is able to charge the unconstrained monopolistic markup, which is in…nity due to the Cobb-Douglas speci…cation in (9) , under the case of complete patent breadth. However, with incomplete patent breadth, potential imitation limits the markup. Speci…cally, the presence of monopolistic pro…ts attracts imitation; therefore, stronger patent protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without the threat of imitation. This formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiro's (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price". 24 See Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) for an analysis of the harmonization of patent protection under TRIPS. 25 See Chu (2008) for a discussion of the political process in determining patent policy in the US.
R&D
Denote v h h r;t is aggregate R&D labor. Z h t denotes aggregate technology in country h capturing the e¤ect of increasing innovation complexity. 29 This formulation of increasing R&D di¢ culty also removes scale e¤ects in the innovation process as in Segerstrom (1998) . 30 The parameter 2 [0; 1) measures the degree of R&D duplication externality as in Jones and Williams (2000) . 31 The parameter ' > 0 determines R&D productivity. The aggregate arrival rate of innovation in country h is
Monetary authority
The nominal value of the aggregate money supply in country h is M
The second equality of (20) applies the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log of (20) with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology in country h given by
One can also derive the analogous equations for fY
Proposition 1
Given constant nominal interest rates fi h ; i f g in the two countries, the aggregate economy gradually converges to a unique and stable balanced growth path along which each variable grows at a constant (possibly zero) rate. 31 We assume to be the same across countries in order to ensure that Z h t and Z f t grow at the same rate in the long run. Equation (23) shows that a balanced growth path would not exist (unless ! 1) if Z Proof. See Appendix A.
For the dynamics of the model, Proposition 1 shows that the aggregate economy gradually converges to a unique and stable balanced growth path (BGP). On the BGP, the share of labor allocated to each sector is stationary, and technologies fZ h t ; Z f t g grow at a constant rate. Consequently, (21) 
where k 2 fh; f g and the steady-state equilibrium arrival rates of innovation are determined by exogenous parameters such that h = (1 )n= ln z h and f = (1 )n= ln z f . Di¤eren-tiating the log of (6) with respect to time yields the growth rate of aggregate consumption given by
. (23) On the BGP, the growth rate of …nal goods is
where k 2 fh; f g. Therefore, the long-run growth rate of aggregate consumption is g C = (2 )n, and the long-run growth rate of per capita consumption in the two countries is g 
Steady-state equilibrium labor allocations
We relegate the de…nition of the equilibrium to Appendix A. Here we sketch out the derivations of the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations in country h. Integrating (17) over yields the free-entry condition in the R&D sector given by v
t . Equation (16) implies that the balanced-growth value of an innovation is v Substituting these conditions along with (14) and (15) into the R&D free-entry condition yields l h r 
To determine the steady-state equilibrium per capita labor supply l h , we apply a
(i.e., the assumption of domestic innovations being owned by the domestic household) on (2) such that (14) and (15) . Substituting (28) and (15) into (4) yields
Solving (25), (26) and (29) yields the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations.
Proposition 2
The equilibrium labor allocations in country h are given by
where
n, which is increasing in h .
33
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (30) shows that R&D labor l h r is decreasing in i h and h (given that i h = h + + (2 )n) via the CIA constraint on R&D (captured by h ) and the CIA constraint on consumption (captured by h ). The intuition of the e¤ect via h is that a higher nominal interest rate increases the cost of R&D, which in turn causes R&D entrepreneurs to reduce their R&D spending. The intuition of the e¤ect via h is that a higher nominal interest rate increases the cost of consumption relative to leisure; as a result, the household increases leisure and decreases labor supply, which also reduces R&D labor. Equation (31) shows that x via h is due to the reallocation of labor from the R&D sector to the production sector. The negative e¤ect of i h and h on l h x via h is due to the reduced supply of labor. Equation (32) shows that labor supply l h is decreasing in i h and h via both CIA constraints.
In ‡ation and economic growth
We now explore the e¤ects of in ‡ation on the growth rate of technologies. 
Using the steady-state equilibrium condition _ Z h t =Z h t = (1 )n, we can rewrite (21) as h . An analogous analysis would show that a permanent increase in the foreign in ‡ation rate leads to a temporary decrease in the growth rate of foreign technology and a permanent decrease in the level of foreign technology & f .
In ‡ation and social welfare
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of domestic and foreign in ‡ation on social welfare. On the BGP, the long-run welfare of the representative household in country h is given by
For analytical tractability, we focus on the special case of ! 1 in (6) in this qualitative analysis. 34 Substituting (7) into (28) 34 We will consider the general case of > 1 in the subsequent quantitative analysis.
where we have dropped all the exogenous terms. The balanced-growth level of …nal goods is given by
where k 2 fh; f g. The balanced-growth level of technologies is given by
where k 2 fh; f g. Substituting (37) and (38) into (36) yields
where we have once again dropped the exogenous terms. In ( f and f . In the following subsections, we will derive (a) the in ‡ation rate that is unilaterally chosen by each government to maximize domestic welfare and (b) the in ‡ation rates that are chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of the two countries. Given that the results di¤er under the following three scenarios, we analyze them separately. In Section 4.1, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply. In Section 4.2, we consider elastic labor supply with only the CIA constraint on R&D investment. In Section 4.3, we consider elastic labor supply with only the CIA constraint on consumption.
Inelastic labor supply
In this subsection, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply (i.e., h = f = 0). In this case, (30) and (31) simplify to
and l h = 1. Due to inelastic labor supply, the e¤ect of in ‡ation operates solely through the CIA constraint on R&D investment. By analogous inference, one can also derive fl (39) and then di¤erentiating U h with respect to h , we obtain the following domestic in ‡ation rate that is unilaterally chosen by the government in country h to maximize the domestic household's welfare:
where r = + (2 )n and h = (1 )n= ln z h are determined by exogenous parameters. By analogous inference, one can also derive the foreign in ‡ation rate f ne that is unilaterally chosen by country f 's government to maximize the welfare of the household in country f . We refer to the pair f h ne ; f ne g as the Nash-equilibrium in ‡ation rates because each government pursues its own objective taking the other government's action as given. An interesting observation is that f ne is also the foreign in ‡ation rate that would be preferred by the government in country h. To see this result, we di¤erentiate U h with respect to f and …nd that the optimal foreign in ‡ation rate for country h is also f ne . Finally, we consider cooperative governments who choose f h ; f g to maximize aggregate welfare de…ned as U h + U f , and we refer to these in ‡ation rates as the optimal in ‡ation rates denoted as f h ; f g. We …nd that f h ; f g = f h ne ; f ne g. In other words, the unilateral action of each government gives rise to an internationally optimal outcome; however, in the next subsection, we will show that this special result is due to the restriction of inelastic labor supply. We summarize the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under inelastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium in ‡ation rate unilaterally chosen by each government coincides with the optimal in ‡ation rate chosen by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate welfare of the two countries.
The comparative statics of the optimal in ‡ation rates can be summarized as follows. The optimal in ‡ation rate in country h is decreasing in the domestic innovation step size z h but increasing in the degree of duplication externality and the size of the markup . The intuition of these results can be easily understood if we compare the equilibrium allocation to the socially optimal allocation. It can be shown that the …rst-best optimal ratio of R&D to production labor is given by 35 e l h r
where g h = (1 )n. Then, we use h = g h = ln z h to rewrite (25) and obtain the equilibrium ratio of R&D to production labor given by
Comparing (43) and (44), we see that a larger z h causes the equilibrium ratio l h r =l h x to decrease relative to the optimal ratio e l h r = e l h x worsening the surplus-appropriability problem, 36 which is a positive externality. In this case, the optimal policy response is to reduce in ‡ation to stimulate R&D. Second, a larger causes the equilibrium ratio l h r =l h x to increase relative to the optimal ratio e l h r = e l h x capturing the negative duplication externality. In this case, the optimal policy response is to raise in ‡ation to depress R&D. Finally, a larger also causes the equilibrium ratio l h r =l h x to increase relative to the optimal ratio e l h r = e l h x due to a strengthening of 35 Derivations available in an unpublished appendix. 36 The surplus-appropriability problem refers to the case in which R&D entrepreneurs do not take into account the external bene…ts to consumers when new innovations occur. the (domestic) business-stealing e¤ect, 37 which is another source of negative R&D externality. In this case, the optimal policy response is also to raise in ‡ation to depress equilibrium R&D.
Elastic labor supply with CIA on R&D only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply (i.e., h > 0) with the CIA constraint on R&D. However, we remove the CIA constraint on consumption by setting h = f = 0. In this case, (30) , (31) and (32) simplify to
By analogous inference, one can also derive fl (39) and then di¤er-entiating U h with respect to h , we obtain the following domestic in ‡ation that is unilaterally chosen by the government in country h to maximize the domestic household's welfare:
where r = + (2 )n and h = (1 )n= ln z h . The analogous in ‡ation rate unilaterally chosen by country f 's government to maximize the welfare of the household in country f is given by
where f = (1 )n= ln z f . We next consider cooperative governments who choose f h ; f g to maximize aggregate welfare U h + U f , and the resulting optimal in ‡ation rates are given by
We see that h ne > h and f ne > f . In other words, the unilateral action of each government generally leads to excessively high in ‡ation in the Nash equilibrium due to a cross-country spillover e¤ect of monetary policy under elastic labor supply. This e¤ect captures the in ‡ationary bias due to monetary policy competition in Cooley and Quadrini (2003) . However, the intuition of our model is di¤erent and can be explained as follows. When a country lowers its in ‡ation rate, the welfare gain from a higher level of technology is shared by the other country, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor supply (l h in (47) is decreasing in h ) falls entirely on the domestic household. As a result, the government does not lower the domestic in ‡ation rate su¢ ciently in the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, cooperative governments would internalize the welfare gain from a higher level of technology in the other country.
Taking the di¤erence of (48) and (50) yields the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal in ‡ation rates in country h given by
which is increasing in the markup . Intuitively, a larger markup strengthens the negative business-stealing externality as discussed before, and the resulting optimal policy response is to increase in ‡ation to reduce R&D. However, in the Nash equilibrium, the cost of higher in ‡ation that depresses the level of technology is shared by the other country. As a result, a noncooperative government would increase in ‡ation more aggressively than a cooperative government would, and the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal in ‡ation rates is monotonically increasing in the market power of …rms. This result di¤ers from the interesting result in Arseneau (2007) , who shows that a larger market power of …rms tends to reduce the in ‡ationary bias. The di¤erent implications between the two studies are due to the di¤erent CIA constraints. We have analyzed a CIA constraint on R&D, whereas Arseneau (2007) analyzes a CIA constraint on consumption. In the next subsection, we show that our model also delivers the insight of Arseneau (2007) under a CIA constraint on consumption.
Proposition 4 Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on R&D, the Nashequilibrium in ‡ation rate unilaterally chosen by each government is higher than the optimal in ‡ation rate chosen by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate welfare of the two countries. The degree of this in ‡ationary bias is monotonically increasing in the market power of …rms.
Elastic labor supply with CIA on consumption only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply (i.e., h > 0) with the CIA constraint on consumption. However, we remove the CIA constraint on R&D by setting h = f = 0. In this case, (30) , (31) and (32) simplify to
By analogous inference, one can also derive fl f r ; l f x g. Substituting (53)- (55) and their analogous equations for fl f r ; l f x g into (39) and then di¤er-entiating U h with respect to h , we obtain the following domestic in ‡ation that is unilaterally chosen by the government in country h to maximize the domestic household's welfare:
where f = (1 )n= ln z f . We also consider cooperative governments who choose f h ; f g to maximize aggregate welfare U h + U f , and the resulting optimal in ‡ation rates are given by
We see that h ne > h and f ne > f . As in the previous case, the unilateral action of each government leads to excessively high in ‡ation in the Nash equilibrium due to the crosscountry spillover e¤ect of monetary policy. However, the degree of this in ‡ationary bias is now decreasing in the markup . To see this result, we take the di¤erence of (56) and (58) and derive the following wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal in ‡ation rates in country h:
which shows that a larger markup would reduce the in ‡ationary bias capturing the dampening e¤ect of monopolistic distortion discussed in Arseneau (2007) . It is useful to note from (53) and (54) that under the CIA constraint on consumption, increasing in ‡ation does not lead to a reallocation of labor from R&D to production but decreases both R&D and production instead. Equation (54) also shows that when the markup increases, production labor decreases. In this case, the optimal policy response is to decrease in ‡ation in order to stimulate production. Given that the in ‡ation rate in the Nash equilibrium is higher to begin with, the government needs to reduce in ‡ation more aggressively in order to achieve the same proportional increase in production l h x , which is a decreasing and convex function in i h (and hence h ).
Proposition 5
Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on consumption, the Nash-equilibrium in ‡ation rate unilaterally chosen by each government is higher than the optimal in ‡ation rate chosen by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate welfare of the two countries. The degree of this in ‡ationary bias is monotonically decreasing in the market power of …rms.
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis of the growth and welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation across countries. We consider the general case with elastic labor supply and both CIA constraints on R&D and consumption. The two-country model features the following set of parameters f ; n; ; ; z h ; z f ; h ; f ; ; s; ; h ; f ; h ; f ; h ; f g. 38 Given the calibrated parameter values, we then perform a quantitative analysis on the e¤ects of in ‡ation in the two economies.
To make this quantitative analysis more realistic, we allow for a non-unitary elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. 39 We consider a value of 2.46 for that is within the range of empirical estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006) . For the value of n, we set it to the average long-run growth rate of the number of R&D scientists and engineers 40 in the US 41 and the Euro Area 42 . As for the markup , we set it to 1.28, which corresponds to an intermediate value of the empirical estimates reported in Jones and Williams (2000) . We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to set the annual discount rate to 0.05 and the time between innovation arrivals f1= h ; 1= f g to 3 years, which allows us to pin down the values of fz h ; z f g = fexp(g= h ); exp(g= f )g given g. As for the leisure parameters f h ; f g, we calibrate them by setting the per capita supply of labor fl h ; l f g to a standard value of 0.33. For the rest of the parameters, we calibrate the model using aggregate data from 1999 to 2007 43 in the US and the Euro Area. To …x notation, we consider the US as the home country h and the Euro Area as the foreign country f . We use data on the relative size of GDP in the US and the Euro Area to calibrate by setting
As for the relative population size, we de…ne s N h t =N t and calibrate it to data. 45 We also normalize N 0 to unity. The average 38 It is useful to note that ' does not a¤ect the other calibrated parameter values and the steady-state welfare e¤ects. 39 We present the equations of the non-cooperative governments'best-response functions and their welfare functions in an unpublished appendix. 40 In the model, the long-run growth rate of technologies is driven by the growth rate of R&D labor as implied by (21) 41 Data source: National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics. 42 Data source: Eurostat. 43 We do not include data from 2008 onwards due to the international …nancial crises. 44 Data source: Eurostat. 45 Data sources: Eurostat, and OECD Labor Force Statistics. growth rate of total factor productivity in the US and the Euro Area is 0.7%, 46 and we use this value to calibrate the duplication externality parameter = 1 g=n. We calibrate the consumption-CIA parameters f h ; f g to the ratios of M1 to consumption in the US and the Euro Area. 47 The average in ‡ation rates in the US and the Euro Area are respectively 2.7% and 2.1%. 48 Given these empirical values of f h ; f g, we calibrate f h ; f g by setting f h ne ; f ne g = f h ; f g. We report the parameter values in Table 4 .
are downward-sloping in Figure 2 implies that this technology-spillover e¤ect dominates the international business-stealing e¤ect under the calibrated parameter values. Finally, our policy experiments are as follows. First, we lower the in ‡ation rates in both economies from the Nash equilibrium to their globally optimal level and examine the e¤ects on social welfare fU h ; U f g. Second, we consider a unilateral deviation from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal in ‡ation rate that maximizes aggregate welfare of the two economies and examine the asymmetric implications on the two economies. Under the current set of calibrated parameter values, the optimal nominal interest rates in both economies are zero (i.e., the Friedman rule is socially optimal) implying that the optimal in ‡ation rates are f h ; f g = f r; rg. We …rst consider the case in which the two governments are cooperative and agree to decrease the in ‡ation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the globally optimal level of r. In this case, the welfare gains are nonnegligible and equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 1.038% in the US and 0.249% in the Euro Area as reported in Table 5 . 50 However, a unilateral deviation to decrease the in ‡ation rate from the Nash equilibrium would hurt the domestic economy and only bene…t the foreign economy, and the cross-country spillover e¤ects are quantitatively signi…cant. For example, we …nd that a unilateral decrease in the in ‡ation rate in the Euro Area would improve welfare in the US by 1.079% but reduce its own welfare by 0.213%. Intuitively, a decrease in in ‡ation raises labor supply L f via the CIA constraints, but the resulting expansion in production in the Euro Area increases consumption in both economies. It is useful to note that the welfare cost of decreasing leisure is borne by the Euro Area but by not the US. As a result, the US experiences a welfare gain whereas the Euro Area experiences a welfare loss. The opposite is true when the US unilaterally decreases in ‡ation. We see in Table 5 that the Euro Area generally experiences a larger welfare loss (or a smaller welfare gain) than the US. The reason 50 Welfare gains are expressed as the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
is that the money-consumption ratio is much higher in the Euro Area (0.63) than in the US (0.16), which in turn implies that the CIA parameters are larger in the Euro Area than in the US as reported in Table 4 . In this case, when in ‡ation decreases, leisure decreases by a larger amount in the Euro Area than in the US, generating the asymmetric welfare e¤ects across the two countries. 
Elasticity of substitution
In this subsection, we perform a robustness check by varying the value of the substitution elasticity 2 [2:2; 3:1], 51 while holding other parameter values constant. We …nd that the Nash equilibrium in ‡ation rates are above the optimal in ‡ation rates as before. However, as the substitution elasticity increases, the strength of the international business-stealing e¤ect increases relative to the technology spillover e¤ect. As a result, the degree of in ‡a-tionary bias becomes smaller, which in turn implies that the welfare gains of decreasing the in ‡ation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level also become smaller. Table  6 summarizes the welfare e¤ects when both countries decrease the in ‡ation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level. The qualitative pattern remains the same as before. In particular, the US experiences a larger welfare gain than the Euro Area. At = 3:1, the Euro Area experiences a small welfare loss, but the overall welfare (i.e., U h + U f ) still increases. 
CIA parameter on consumption
In this subsection, we perform another robustness check by varying the parameter value of the CIA constraint on consumption while holding other parameter values constant. In this case, the Nash equilibrium in ‡ation rates continue to be above the optimal in ‡ation rates. As before, Table 7 reports the welfare gains when both countries decrease the in ‡ation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the level prescribed by the Friedman rule. As the degree of the CIA constraint on consumption in the Euro Area decreases to the level in the US (i.e., h = f = 0:16), the welfare e¤ects become smaller in both countries. Nevertheless, even in the absence of the CIA constraints on consumption (i.e., h = f = 0), the welfare gains of decreasing in ‡ation from the Nash equilibrium remain nonnegligible. f ne g = f3:70%; 2:08%g. In this case, the Nash equilibrium continues to exhibit an in ‡ationary bias. Therefore, we proceed to quantify the welfare e¤ects of decreasing the in ‡ation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level. Table 8 reports the results, which show that both the qualitative pattern and the quantitative magnitude of the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation are largely the same as before. 
Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the growth and welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation in an openeconomy version of the Schumpeterian growth model with CIA constraints on consumption and R&D investment. We …nd that economic growth and social welfare are a¤ected by domestic and foreign in ‡ation. Furthermore, the cross-country welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation are quantitatively signi…cant. These spillover e¤ects give rise to an in ‡ationary bias in the Nash equilibrium and prevent noncooperative governments from implementing optimal policies even in the long run. According to our simulation results, the optimal nominal interest rates in the two countries are generally zero; 52 therefore, a supranational authority choosing a uniform interest rate to maximize global welfare would improve welfare. Our analysis serves to provide a quanti…cation of the potential welfare gains from a common monetary policy in monetary unions. 53 A natural question that arises is whether monetary policy still plays a role when …scal policy, such as R&D subsidies, is present. In the case of inelastic labor supply, increasing R&D subsidies and decreasing in ‡ation would have identical e¤ects on the economy by shifting labor from production to R&D. In this case, if R&D subsidies are chosen optimally, then monetary policy would play a redundant role in the innovation process. However, in the case of elastic labor supply and in the absence of lump-sum tax, …nancing R&D subsidies could create distortionary e¤ects on the economy. For example, suppose R&D subsidies are …nanced by a labor-income tax. Then, increasing R&D subsidies raises the income tax rate and reduces labor supply. In contrast, decreasing in ‡ation increases labor supply via the two CIA constraints as shown in (32) . Therefore, the e¤ects of these two instruments are not identical. More importantly, …scal policy is often determined via a political process in which participants may not have the objective of maximizing social welfare. In contrast, monetary policy is often viewed as less likely to be subject to such political in ‡uences.
For future research in this literature, it would be useful to have more empirical evidence on the determinants of the CIA constraints, which potentially di¤er in magnitude across countries. Furthermore, our analysis is based on a semi-endogenous-growth version of the Schumpeterian model that removes scale e¤ects. It may be a fruitful extension to explore the crosscountry spillover e¤ects of in ‡ation in other vintages of the Schumpeterian growth model, such as the second-generation Schumpeterian growth models in Peretto (1998), Howitt (1999) and Segerstrom (2000) . We leave this interesting extension to future research.
where the second equality follows from (28) . Combining (14) , (16) and (18) 
where 
where we have dropped all the exogenous terms. Substituting (37)- (38) into (B8) yields where we have once again dropped the exogenous terms. The government in country h chooses h to maximize the welfare of the representative household in country h. We substitute (30) 
+
Moreover, the analogous expression of (B9) for U f is given by (38) into (B19) and di¤erentiating it with respect to h yields
where we have used (B10). Substituting (38) , (A18) and (A19) into (B19) and di¤erentiating it with respect to f yields
where we have used (B15). Based on (B20) and (B21), the market share of …nal goods is decreasing in h and increasing in f due to the international business-stealing e¤ect via technologies fZ h 0 ; Z f 0 g.
